Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on by Greg Frost-Arnold

By Greg Frost-Arnold

During the tutorial yr 1940-1941, a number of giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard, conserving typical inner most conferences, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard permits the reader to behave as a fly at the wall for his or her conversations. Carnap took designated notes in the course of his 12 months at Harvard. This publication comprises either a German transcription of those shorthand notes and an English translation within the appendix part. Carnap’s notes disguise a variety of themes, yet unusually, the main favourite query is: If the variety of actual goods within the universe is finite, what shape should still clinical discourse take? this question is heavily hooked up to an abiding philosophical challenge: what's the courting among the logico-mathematical realm and the fabric realm? Carnap, Tarski, and Quine’s makes an attempt to respond to this query contain concerns valuable to philosophy today.This ebook makes a speciality of 3 such matters: nominalism, the cohesion of technological know-how, and analyticity. briefly, the publication reconstructs the strains of argument represented in those Harvard discussions, discusses their ancient importance (especially Quine’s holiday from Carnap), and relates them whilst attainable to modern remedies of those issues.

Show description

Read Online or Download Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science PDF

Best other social sciences books

A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise

Annette Baier's target is to make experience of David Hume's Treatise as an entire. Hume's relations motto, which appears to be like on his bookplate, was once "True to the tip. " Baier argues that it's not till the top of the Treatise that we get his complete tale approximately "truth and falsehood, cause and folly. " by way of the tip, we will be able to see the reason to which Hume has been precise through the paintings.

Additional info for Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science

Example text

Have for me an irresistible intuitive validity. I see no contradiction, therefore, in saying that I advocate a rather radical ‘formalism’ in the construction of my system even though I am an obdurate ‘intuitionist’. (Le´sniewski 1992, 487) 29. See also Si m o ns (2002). 2) with a ‘calculus’ which simply specifies rules for symbol manipulation. g. the prohibition on higher-order quantification), the requirement that the domain D contain only physical objects is not purely formal. 2 Russellian influences It may be an understatement to say that Russell towers over logically-informed and logically-inspired philosophy in the twentieth century, especially before 1940.

Onomatoids,’ that is, merely apparent names, not genuine names. ’ In places, Kotarbi´ nski suggests that the reist’s paraphrase is in fact what was really meant all along (Kotarbi´ nski 1929/1966, 432): a hermaneutic reconstruction of everyday language, instead of a revolutionary one, in the terminology of Burgess and Rosen (1996). D. 28 27. ‘ B u t,’ t he m oder n reader m ay object, ‘ p redicates do n ot design ate co ncrete bodies. ’ T h is m oder n u n derst a n di ng of p redicates is n ot shared by K ot arbi n´ sk i , who holds t he ( u lt i m ately m edieval) view t hat si ngu lar ter ms n a m e a si ngle (co ncrete) t h i ng, wh i le p redicates n a m e several (co ncrete) t h i ngs.

Pre-history of the 1941 Finitist-Nominalist Project 21 Le´sniewski rejects the classical set-theoretic conception of classes, replacing it with the notion of a mereological whole (which he nonetheless called a ‘class,’ for he believed it was the salvageable remainder of the notion Cantor studied). Le´sniewski bases his logic on the symbol ‘ ,’ which is intended to formalize the (ordinary language) copula. ’ One might think this latter smuggles in class-membership. However, the idea is that ‘B’ just names many concrete things—along the lines of the medieval nominalists’ view.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.80 of 5 – based on 17 votes