Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh (S U N Y Series in by Fred Evans, Leonard Lawlor

By Fred Evans, Leonard Lawlor

Top students discover the later considered Merleau-Ponty and its important function within the modernism-postmodernism debate. the very best interpretations and reviews of Merleau-Ponty's cutting edge notions of chiasm and flesh are provided right here by means of widespread students from the us and Europe. Divided into 3 sections, the e-book first establishes the inspiration of the flesh as a constant proposal and unfolds the nuances of flesh that make it a compelling suggestion. the second one part provides to the strength of this concept by means of displaying how flesh may be prolonged to phenomena that Merleau-Ponty used to be unable to regard, similar to the web and digital truth, and the 3rd deals criticisms of Merleau-Ponty from feminist and Levinasian issues of view. the entire essays attest to the fecundity of Merleau-Ponty's later idea for such valuable philosophical concerns because the bonds among self, others, and the realm.

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Additional resources for Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh (S U N Y Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy)

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But, for Merleau-Ponty, acknowledging its existence cannot mean fusion and coincidence with the origin of vision. That by which everything begins, “nature” or “the originary,” is not behind us in a past into which one would have to go in order to rejoin the origin; rather it lies in the écart of the present from this past, in the écart that is the space of our whole experience (VI 165/124. Cf. also 320/267). It is today, in the depth of the lived and in the presence of the flesh of the world that “the originating breaks up, and philosophy must accompany this break-up, this non-coincidence, this differentiation” (VI 165/124).

In The Visible and the Invisible, he even proposes to exclude the term perception in favor of perceptual faith, because the one who says “perception” “already implies a cutting up of what is lived into discontinuous acts, or a reference to ‘things’ whose status is not specified” (VI 209/158). It is true that perception, not in the sense of a sensorial function but as “archetype of the originating encounter,” remains at the most basic level of the investigation. But it is possible that this encounter with what is not-us is not the experience of an absence, any more than of an original presence (VI 210/159).

This is why we can speak about perception in the same way as we do about World, Flesh, Vision 29 a language: “I describe perception as a diacritical, relative, oppositional system” (VI 267/213), applying to it the terminology that Saussure had reserved for language. There is certainly a “relative positivity of perceiving,” a sensible world of things, but this is not an objective being, substantial, completed; the sensible is never itself given except in an elusive manner, and it is strictly “ungraspable” (VI 267/214).

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